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98 
DILUTION’S (STILL) UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie* 
Mark D. Janis** † 
Dilution looked to be a potent weapon when Congress introduced it as § 
43(c) of the Lanham Act in 1995. Indeed, some observers feared that it 
would be too potent (and in some contexts, such as cybersquatting, it suc-
cessfully augmented traditional causes of action). But a series of court 
decisions, culminating in the Supreme Court’s 2003 Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue opinion, weakened dilution protection so profoundly that what 
remained wasn’t of much consequence. 
Congress has recently sought to breathe new life into dilution law, enact-
ing the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”). Some might 
see this as a legislative resuscitation of § 43(c), but it’s not quite accurate to 
characterize the TDRA in such categorical terms. On the one hand, the 
TDRA adopts a likelihood of dilution standard, abrogating the holding of V 
Secret. In addition, the TDRA expressly endorses tarnishment and blurring 
as forms of dilution, clarifies that dilution protection is available for marks 
that have acquired distinctiveness, eliminates “commercial” use as an ele-
ment of the prima facie claim, and acknowledges, albeit in a back-handed 
manner, that dilution protection is available for trade dress. On the other 
hand, the TDRA also tightens the fame prerequisite, shuts the door to new 
forms of dilution, and arguably makes the use requirement stricter in other 
respects, all moves that may make dilution actions harder to sustain.  
So how will the TDRA fare in the courts? In the short term, some judges 
may detect a congressional signal that dilution is to be taken seriously again. 
But there are good reasons to believe that the TDRA has not put to rest the 
concerns that generated judicial resistance under pre-TDRA law. Judges are 
unlikely to have lost their distaste for rights that appear unconnected to the 
protection of consumers, or their solicitude for speech interests, both of 
which underlay skepticism of dilution protection pre-TDRA. Until propo-
nents of dilution law develop a clear and autonomous theoretical basis for 
protection, those impulses are not likely to remain dormant for long. Courts 
will feel particularly free to act on these fundamental concerns if the new 
law contains ambiguities. And it does. To illustrate this continuing problem 
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for dilution, we consider two aspects of the new law that we expect will be 
among the focal points of the judicial response to the TDRA: the forms of 
dilution and the use as mark requirement.  
I. Forms of Dilution 
The patchwork of state laws that the 1995 law sought to federalize rou-
tinely recognized two forms of dilution: dilution by tarnishment and dilution 
by blurring. Tarnishment typically arose in cases in which a trademark was 
associated with shoddy or unseemly products. Blurring was never well-
defined, but was implicated in cases where a trademark’s use by a variety of 
unconnected parties on a disparate range of products or services would un-
dermine the signaling function of the brand. 
The 1995 changes to the Lanham Act did not define the forms of dilu-
tion that were actionable. The concepts of tarnishment and blurring were 
mentioned in legislative debates, but the statute grounded liability on the 
general standard that defendant’s use caused a “lessening of the capacity . . . 
to identify and distinguish goods.” For the most part, courts simply assumed 
that Congress meant to recognize blurring and tarnishment, and perhaps was 
amenable to rendering actionable other forms of dilution as well, such as 
dilution by cybersquatting. Courts, however, never developed a coherent test 
for blurring, and dicta in V Secret appeared to question whether § 43(c) em-
braced tarnishment in the absence of express statutory language. 
The TDRA responds by recognizing, and defining, both dilution by blur-
ring and dilution by tarnishment. Tarnishment is defined as a third party use 
that creates an association that “harms the reputation of the famous mark.” 
Although this clarifies that dilution by tarnishment is indeed actionable, the 
definition is hardly self-limiting, a feature that has always made tarnishment 
potentially overbroad. And the lack of any articulated theoretical basis for 
tarnishment means that courts cannot infer limits by providing a purposive 
gloss to the definition. Instead, courts seeking to cabin the tarnishment 
cause of action will likely rely on the revised affirmative defenses or de-
velop a trademark use requirement (discussed below). A theoretical basis for 
those defenses does exist (e.g., free speech values), even if their application 
is often contested. 
Similarly, the effectiveness of the TDRA’s attempt to clarify the concept 
of blurring is likely to be hampered by the lack of clear distinctions between 
classic infringement and dilution actions and the failure to connect theory to 
doctrine. In particular, there have been efforts by courts and scholars to ra-
tionalize protection against blurring as an extension of the traditional 
trademark concern for reducing search costs. And courts have tried to make 
operational the gist of blurring concerns. For example, in Mead Data Cen-
tral, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., decided under the New York 
statute several years before the enactment of federal protection, Judge Sweet 
suggested that whether blurring had occurred should be determined by ex-
amining six factors: (i) similarity of the marks; (ii) similarity of the products 
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covered by the marks; (iii) sophistication of consumers; (iv) predatory in-
tent; (v) renown of the senior mark; and (vi) renown of the junior mark. 
When courts began adjudicating cases under the federal statute, some 
judges simply adopted Judge Sweet’s factors as a means of assessing blur-
ring. Others, notably Judge Leval in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., were 
more critical of certain factors, and indeed of the whole notion of a closed 
list of relevant factors. The TDRA adopts a multi-factor approach that is 
strongly reminiscent of Judge Sweet’s factors. The statute does respond in 
part to the Nabisco critique. It discards “renown” in favor of separate as-
sessments of the “degree of recognition of the famous mark” and the 
“degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark.” It also 
makes clear that the factors are not exclusive or even mandatory. 
We think, however, that the TDRA multi-factor approach will merely 
trigger judicial resistance to blurring causes of action. Blurring arguably 
lacks any distinct theoretical basis. The most persuasive scholarly defenses 
rest on the same search costs rationale as classic confusion-based infringe-
ment. As a result, blurring often looks too much like a second shot at 
proving likelihood of confusion under a slightly different verbal formulation 
(and applying doctrine, such as the fame requirement, which seems uncon-
nected to the theoretical justification of reducing search costs). Courts 
finding for a defendant on the question of likely confusion are unlikely to 
react favorably to the TDRA multi-factor analysis. It looks like little more 
than confusion analysis with a different paint job. Of course, the TDRA 
does not require courts to employ the blurring factors. A court might ignore 
the multi-factor test altogether in favor of any number of different ap-
proaches.  This flexibility may provide sufficient room for courts to act on 
the same underlying hostility that led to V Secret. 
II. Use as a Mark 
The TDRA also wades into debates that are taking place within the 
broader remit of trademark law. In particular, in rather ambiguous language, 
the act seeks to impose a requirement that an alleged infringer be using the 
plaintiff’s famous mark as a mark. The so-called trademark use requirement 
has been the subject of recent litigation in infringement proceedings, pri-
marily with respect to the unauthorized use of marks in the sale of pop-up 
advertising or sponsored links on search engines. In that context, in 1-800 
Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., the Second Circuit last year announced 
that a defendant could not be held liable absent use of the plaintiff’s mark as 
a mark. Lower courts remain split on this question, but some scholars have 
argued that the TDRA extends the Second Circuit’s position to dilution ac-
tions. 
That the TDRA did in fact impose a trademark use requirement was 
clearer in earlier versions of the legislation. Thus, in a prior version, the leg-
islation included a requirement that the defendant use the plaintiff’s mark 
“as a designation of source.” Some bar associations objected, arguing that 
the term “designation of source” was unknown to trademark law and would 
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as a result create substantial uncertainty. To meet that objection, the lan-
guage in question was changed to require that the defendant make “use of a 
mark or trade name,” a formulation not substantially different from that 
found in the 1995 legislation. If Congress was trying to enact a trademark 
use requirement, it did so inartfully. First, the requirement is strictly not a 
trademark use requirement, but a “use as a mark or a trade name” require-
ment. Second, the language still requires use of a mark or trade name 
(although the slight changes to the word order of the prima facie claim make 
it marginally easier to argue that the TDRA is directed at use as a mark or 
trade name). Third, as we’ve argued in Confusion Over Use: Contextualism 
in Trademark Law (forthcoming 2007), we’re not persuaded that anyone 
knows what trademark use really means. 
If the courts do find a trademark use requirement in the TDRA, the un-
certainties of what constitutes trademark use (only now being litigated 
explicitly in the infringement context) will once again allow courts to act 
upon an underlying hostility to dilution law. We expect defendants to seize 
on the contested nature of that concept. The result will likely be a very nar-
row interpretation of what constitutes “use as a mark,” arguably with 
consequences for trademark law generally. 
Of course, this incidental and unhelpful intrusion upon general trade-
mark law could have consequences which are even more unpredictable. 
Given the language in the TDRA supposedly requiring a trademark use in 
order to find liability, what is one to make of the different language in § 32 
or § 43(a)? Although Congress was not purporting to speak on the elements 
of an infringement cause of action, it would not be a surprise if a litigant 
were to try to exploit the difference between the language in the infringe-
ment and dilution provisions; on the whole, courts are less hostile to 
confusion-based claims. 
Introducing a trademark use requirement would also raise questions re-
garding the interaction of the prima facie elements of the dilution claim and 
the affirmative defenses. In this regard, Congress has undermined the logi-
cal coherence of the new law in much the same way as it did the old. In the 
1995 Act, “commercial use” in commerce was an element of the prima facie 
claim. Yet it was not obvious how that requirement interacted with the af-
firmative defense of “noncommercial use.” The Ninth Circuit reconciled 
these provisions in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. by concluding that the 
noncommercial use defense immunized speech protected by the First 
Amendment, which includes some use that is commercial. There was a con-
sensus developing in the lower courts regarding the meaning of the term 
“commercial use.” Just as that common understanding was emerging, Con-
gress has, in the TDRA, belatedly resolved the textual incoherence by 
deleting the requirement of “commercial use.”  
But Congress has replaced one form of incoherence with another in the 
way that it has legislated the use as a mark requirement. Thus, § 43(c)(3)(A) 
excuses a defendant’s fair use “other than as a designation of source.” How-
ever, what conduct within the scope of the prima facie claim (which must, it 
is claimed, be “use as a mark”) is excused by § 43(c)(3)(A)? Indeed, the 
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defense seems to protect a narrower range of third-party use than might be 
excluded from liability by the element of the prima facie claim because the 
defense has a fair use hurdle built into it as well. Thus, if trademark use is 
an element of the prima facie claim, the defense may be little needed. The 
ambiguities in the trademark use concept may well provide a sufficient 
opening for hostile courts to find that no prima facie dilution claim has been 
made. 
To the extent that courts do rely on the fair use defense, the language of 
that defense might also prompt examination of broader trademark concepts. 
The new § 43(c)(3)(A) excludes liability for any fair use “including a nomi-
native or descriptive fair use . . . other than as a designation of source for the 
[defendant’s] own goods or services.” But it is not clear how courts under-
stand “nominative use” despite the efforts of the Ninth Circuit to draw a 
clean line between nominative and descriptive use. Will litigation of 
§ 43(c)(3)(A) be the vehicle for further exploration of that concept? Indeed, 
a literal reading of the defense (and, in particular, the term “including”) 
might suggest that Congress intended to acknowledge fair uses other than 
nominative or descriptive use. This is probably not what Congress intended, 
but is there room for development of other examples of fair use?  
Conclusion 
Although the TDRA frames dilution with new language, old problems 
remain. The central concepts in dilution law remain enigmatic, and the con-
cept of trademark use exacerbates the uncertainties. Until independent 
policy rationales for dilution are articulated more precisely and connected to 
the contours of the implementing doctrine, it is likely that courts will re-
ceive the new version of dilution with the same overriding skepticism that 
led them to eviscerate the old law (and some state dilution laws before that). 
